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We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of 
incomplete information. We make the realistic assumption that the players are boundedly rational: they 
base their actions on finite-order belief hierarchies. When the different layers of beliefs are independent 
of each other, we can retain Harsányi’s type-space, and we can define straightforward generalizations of 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) and Rationalizability in our context. Since neither of these concepts 
is quite satisfactory, we propose a hybrid concept, Mirage Equilibrium, providing us with a practical 
tool to work with inconsistent belief hierarchies. When the different layers of beliefs are correlated, we 
must enlarge the type-space to include the parametric beliefs. This presents us with the difficulty of the 
inherent openness of finite belief subspaces. Appealing to bounded rationality once more, we posit that 
the players believe that their opponent holds a belief hierarchy one layer shorter than they do and we 
provide alternative generalizations of BNE and Rationalizability. Finally, we show that, when beliefs 
are degenerate point beliefs, the definition of Mirage Equilibrium coincides with that of the generalized 
BNE. 
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1. Proem 
Consider the following simple situation. Bob is competing in a Cournot duopoly with Ann. The two of them 
produce perfect substitutes at zero cost and compete in quantities. Unfortunately, the demand for their product 
is not known. There are two demand forecasting agencies in town, offering two different predictions, type 1: p 
= 1 - q, and type 2: p = 1 - 2q. Bob is known to use the type 1 model,1 however, he does not know which 
agency Ann uses. His prior is that, with probability a, she also uses model 1 – and thus she uses model 2 with 
probability 1-a. Moreover, he believes that Ann's belief about a is described by the probability density 
function, g(.). How much would/should Bob produce if this were all the information he had available? 
 In this paper, we would like to convince the reader of three points: 
i) The above example is representative of interesting economic situations, which hitherto have not been 
rigorously analyzed by economists. 
ii) The reason for this apparent neglect is that the available game theoretic models/concepts cannot 
adequately address these situations. 
iii) There is a way to deal with these situations, which is consistent in spirit with the standard approach. 
2. Introduction 
In his seminal paper, János Harsányi (1967-68) invented a way to elude the difficulties associated with the 
infinite hierarchies of beliefs that arise as a consequence of asymmetric information about the payoffs2 in a 
game. His contribution was decisive in opening up the possibilities for the analysis of games of incomplete 
information in the field of Economics (as it was recognized by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in 
1994). However, next to the enormous benefit it created, his theory also caused the negative externality of 
drawing game theorists' attention away from the analysis of higher-order beliefs.3 The convenient assumption 
of priors being common knowledge – and often, even common – is predominant not only in the literature but 
also in the minds of economists in general. The aim of this paper is to complement the "Harsányi doctrine" 
(here understood more generally, as the assumption of common knowledge priors) with a less restrictive 
approach, which allows for the modeling of irreconcilable differences among the players' beliefs, without 
sacrificing tractability. That is, we propose a level of analysis that is intermediate between Harsányi's and 
Mertens and Zamir's (1985) treatment. The latter two authors do provide a general (in fact, "universal") model 
of belief hierarchies, however, their treatment has not proven useful for applied analysis.  
 In game situations where the assumption of common knowledge priors is inappropriate4 – that is, 
there are reasons to believe that the players do not know each other's beliefs – it is necessary to analyze the 
                                                        
1 We assume this for simplicity. 
2 As Harsányi himself argues, all other types of uncertainty (about strategy sets, number of players etc.) can be reduced to this 
general case. 
3 At least for a long while. See Monderer and Samet (1989), Rubinstein (1989), Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) or Morris, 
Postlewaite and Shin (1995), for examples of recent contributions. 
4 This, actually, is a very large set, encompassing all areas of economic theory. Of course, there are many variants of the example 
given in the proem. The uncertainty may be about productivity, external shocks, etc. However, Industrial Organization is not the 3 
effects of variations in the higher-order beliefs to obtain some reliable prediction/prescription about player 
behavior. Once we desist from imposing common knowledge of priors, we open up a Pandora's box, not only 
because we have to explicitly consider the maze of higher-order beliefs but mainly since we are no longer 
obliged to posit that these beliefs are correct. Following the approach laid out in this paper, we are able to 
model any situation where players hold higher-order beliefs which are inconsistent with the "truth." Such 
inconsistencies are all the more relevant to investigate, since they are not only present in the static settings 
analyzed in this paper, but may even persist over time (see the experimental literature on false equilibria, for 
example, Camerer and Weigelt, 1991).  
In a strategic situation, before deciding on what to do, a player has to predict how her opponents will 
behave. To be able to do that, she has to have a belief about her opponents' view of the game. But they also 
have to do the same, etc. and therefore, the uncertainty about the game being played generates an infinite belief 
hierarchy. Unless the game played is common knowledge, these hierarchies make the analysis practically 
intractable. Harsányi (1967-68) has argued that if the game itself is not common knowledge but the 
distribution which each possible view(belief hierarchy)-holder – type – attaches to the space of these types is 
common knowledge, we can carry out a meaningful analysis in the context of a game of imperfect information, 
with the above mentioned types as its players. This has brought us to the concept of Bayesian games. These 
games are versatile, encompassing many different types of asymmetries among the players.  
 Indeed, we start our study by setting up the benchmark Bayesian game proposed by Harsányi. Having 
defined the framework we are then able to give the definitions of the two salient solution concepts in this 
context: Rationalizability and Harsányi's Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). 
 The next question has been, what if the Bayesian game played is not common knowledge? By 
redefining the notion of a type as one which includes the entire belief hierarchy, Mertens and Zamir (1985) 
showed that, by sufficiently enlarging the type-space – that is, explicitly modeling more and more levels of 
beliefs –, we can replace the assumption of common knowledge of priors (that is, first-order beliefs) over the 
attributes by common knowledge of beliefs over this “universal” type-space. Thus, if we substitute the 
attribute-space with the universal type-space, we obtain a game that is qualitatively equivalent to Harsányi's, 
and in particular is one with common knowledge “priors.” Their construction is based on the proof that the 
description of a universal type contains all its beliefs, including the one over the universal type-space. That is, 
common knowledge of beliefs can be derived as a result, instead of having to assume it. While the closedness 
property of the universal belief-spaces does provide the theoretical foundations for Harsányi's model, we claim 
that for applications it does not serve the purpose. A problem with the Mertens-Zamir types is that – unless 
some regularity assumptions are made – in general,5 they are of such complexity that they are not even 
describable and, therefore, they are not useful for applied analysis. Therefore, if we want to retain the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
only field, for which the analysis developed in this paper may be relevant. Consider, for example, the following: do countries 
know each other's CGE models in a game of international macroeconomic policy coordination?; do we really need noise traders 
for trade in equilibrium in a financial market?; etc. 
5 Note that we do not claim that there are no models using the universal types, which can be parsimoniously described. Rather, 
that the applied analyst is likely to encounter situations, where this is not the case.  4 
tractability of Harsányi's approach, we need to give a different answer to the question asked above. This is 
what we do in this paper. 
 The need for tractability and the absence of common knowledge leads us to model the view of each 
player as a game where the players hold finite belief hierarchies over some primitive space of attributes, which 
do not include beliefs. The assumption of finite depth reasoning – apart from being very plausible – has been 
corroborated by both theoretical and experimental evidence. Stahl (1993) showed that in an evolutionary 
setting, a population initially composed of players of different depth of reasoning does not converge in general 
towards an infinitely smart population. Stahl and Wilson (1995) found that the hypothesis of the presence of a 
"rational expectations type" in the pool of their experimental subjects – corresponding to a player who forms 
unbounded belief hierarchies – can be rejected. Nagel (1995) also demonstrated that her model of finite steps 
of reasoning is consistent with the observed behavior in her experiment. 
 We continue our inquiry along two strands, depending on whether the different layers of the belief 
hierarchy are independent. When they are, it is possible – though not necessary – to maintain the definition of a 
strategy as a function exclusively of the attributes. This result follows from the reinterpretation of higher order 
beliefs as beliefs over the attribute space, by “integrating out” the rest of the variables. With this simple type-
space, it is straightforward to define the appropriate generalizations of BNE and Rationalizability (Subjective 
Bayesian Equilibrium, SBE, and Partially Subjective Rationalizability, PASUR, respectively). We have found 
neither of these new concepts satisfactory for application. SBE suffers from the caveat that it hypothesizes a 
strategy for the other player, which is not consistent with the solution itself. On the other hand, PASUR is very 
weak, since the highest-order strategic beliefs are assumed unconstrained. In order to provide an internally 
consistent and powerful solution for this context, we define a hybrid concept between SBE and PASUR: 
Mirage Equilibrium. In a Mirage Equilibrium, each player forms a strategic belief hierarchy (of the same 
length as the parametric belief hierarchy, which is given as part of the description of the game). These strategic 
belief hierarchies satisfy two conditions. Every layer is a best response to the next one conditional on the 
parametric beliefs and, the last two layers form a SBE. 
 Next, we turn to the case of general (though still finite) belief hierarchies. In this case, it is no longer 
possible to retain all the relevant information with strategies depending only on the attributes. On the other 
hand, if we allowed the entire belief hierarchy to form part of the strategies’ arguments, we would run into the 
problem that the players would not be able to evaluate the expected actions of their opponents because of the 
lack of an additional layer of belief. This is the openness property of finite-order belief spaces. To resolve this 
problem, we assume that every player believes that the other player conditions his strategy on one fewer layers 
of beliefs than herself.6 This assumption clears the way for the generalization of Rationalizability to this 
context, however, for a Nash-like concept, we need to make a further choice. Note that, the above assumption 
implies that when we check that two strategies are best responses to each other, the same strategy would 
appear with a different number of arguments at different places. In order to restore the equivalence, we 
                                                        
6 While we have found no direct empirical evidence for this phenomenon, it is well established that people tend to be 
overconfident in their judgments, overrating their information and/or abilities (see, for example, Schmalensee, 1976, Alpert and 
Raiffa, 1982, or Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram, 1996). 5 
augment the domain of the higher-order (and therefore the one of fewer arguments) strategic belief with the 
corresponding arguments of the lower-order belief. The idea behind this rule is that this way, when the beliefs 
are correct we recover BNE. 
Finally, we carry out a consistency check between our solution concepts. To this end, we assume that, 
apart from the beliefs about the underlying attribute-space (that is, the first-order beliefs), the rest of the beliefs 
are degenerate point-beliefs. Calculating the solution concepts defined for the general case under this 
assumption, we show that the generalized BNE collapses into Mirage Equilibrium, while the generalized 
Rationalizability into PASUR. This result gives further credibility to the concept of Mirage Equilibrium.  
 We close the paper with some remarks on the difficulties in extending our results to dynamic games. 
3. The standard model 
In order to fix ideas, in this section we discuss Harsányi's theory. Let us begin with some preliminaries. 
 For a finite set of N players indexed from 1 to N, we define an N-person game of incomplete 
information as the collection of 
i) an underlying space of attributes (types), K = ·i=1
N Ki, 
ii) a set of feasible mixed actions, S =·i=1
N Si, 
iii) parametric utility functions for each player, Vi = Ki · S ﬁ ￿ , and 
iv) beliefs over the attribute space (priors) for each player, Ri ˛ D(K) . 
 The cornerstone assumption of Harsányi’s theory is that the entire game, including the priors, is 
common knowledge among the players. Consequently, the players’ strategies are functions of (only) the 
attributes, si: Ki ﬁ Si. Given a strategy profile, the payoff function of Player i – that is, her objective function 
– is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ), ( , , (.) ), ( , i i i i i i i i i i i i i i k k V k R k k U
i i
- - - - s = s ￿
- ˛ -
k ó k ó
K k
. 
  The fundamental building block for the analysis of the behavior of – even boundedly – rational agents 
is their best response mapping, which we define next. 
Definition 1  The strategy of Player i, si(.), is a best response to a profile of strategies of the rest of the 
players, s s-i(.), – denoted si ˛ BR(s s-i, Ri) – if and only if for all ki ˛ Ki, si(ki) maximizes 
( ) (.) ), ( , i i i i i k k U - s ó . 
Remark: For the purposes of the best response mapping, s s-i(.) can also be interpreted as a conjecture over the 
strategies of the players other than i, where the probability attached to each pure strategy is the result of taking 
expected values according to the original probability function, mapping mixed strategies to probabilities.7 That 
                                                        
7 This is a standard result, see, for example, Pearce (1984) for a proof. 6 
is, if Player i believes, for example, that with probability .4  Player j is mixing fifty-fifty between pure actions 
a and b and with probability .6 she is taking pure action a, then this is equivalent to i believing almost surely 
that j is mixing .8-.2 between a and b.  
 Armed with the best response mapping, we are now ready to give the definitions of what we think of 
as the possible "solutions" to our Bayesian game. In honor of its inventor, we start with Harsányi's 
equilibrium: 
Definition 2  The profile of strategies, s s, constitutes a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium  (BNE) if and only if si 
˛ BR(s s-i, Ri), i = 1,2,...,N. 
 While Nash Equilibria are self-enforcing, and they are a likely limit of the converging play in repeated 
games (see, for example, Kalai and Lehrer, 1993a), they are not necessarily the best predictors of strategic 
interaction, especially in a one-shot, static setting. On the other hand, if we only assume common knowledge of 
rationality (conditional utility maximization) on the part of the players, we arrive at a more natural (though less 
exclusive) concept of solution: Rationalizability. The extension of Bernheim's (1984) and Pearce's (1984) 
original concept to our setting is straightforward. Let us denote by i#j(k) a sequence of k player indices whose 
first element is i, last element is j and where no two successive elements are identical. 
Definition 3  The strategy profile s s(.), is Bayes Rationalizable if and only if there exist strategy profiles 
s si#j(k),  such that, for all i 
i) si ˛BR(s s-i
i
, Ri ), 
ii) s j
i ˛BR(s s-j
i, j,Rj) for j „ i, 
iii) sk
i#m(n ) ˛BR(s s-k
i#m (n),k
, Rk ) for k „ m and n = 2,3,...  .  
Here, a strategy like s j
i,k,i  is the belief i has about k's belief about i's belief about j's strategy. Given the 
equivalence between point-beliefs and conjectures (c.f. the remark following the definition of the best response 
mapping), we suggest, however, that it should be thought of as the point-belief i holds about the point-belief k 
holds about the point-belief i holds about j's strategy. 
 In order to assist the reader in grasping the different information structures and the corresponding 
solution concepts appearing in this paper, we will work out as an example for each case of the situation 
described in the Proem. For this section, we assume that the above setup – and especially Bob's prior – is 
common knowledge (and thus g puts probability one on a). Then the BNE strategies of the three types are 
given by the solution to the following system: 
b = argmaxq q(1 - q - aa1 - (1 - a)a2), 
 a1 = argmaxq q(1 - q - b), (I) 
a2 = argmaxq q(1 - 2(q + b)). 




,   a1 = 
12
3 a +




Because of the strategic complementarities, it is straightforward to show that Bob has a unique rationalizable 
strategy and thus the set of rationalizable strategies is a singleton for each type, coinciding with the BNE. 
4. Private beliefs 
In this section, we relax the cornerstone assumption of the Harsányi theory about the prior beliefs over the 
attribute space being common knowledge. As we discussed it in the Introduction, Mertens and Zamir (1985) 
have generalized Harsányi’s result to this case, by enlarging the type-space. In order to complement the 
Mertens-Zamir construction in a way, which is more tractable, and also captures the bounded rationality of the 
players, we take an alternative route. Our main assumption is that the players only construct finite-depth8 belief 
hierarchies over the attribute space. Given this restriction on the type-space, the Mertens-Zamir approach is no 
longer valid. Our new approach has two strands. Like in Auction Theory, we distinguish between the cases 
when information/beliefs are independent and when they are not. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to 
two-player games. 
 The lack of common knowledge about the game being played has some direct implications on what we 
require of "reasonable" solution concepts. For example, the self-enforcing nature of equilibrium is no longer 
the right characteristic to look for. To see why, consider a candidate equilibrium profile which is such that all 
the players would be willing to follow their part if they expected the rest of the players to play according to the 
candidate profile (self-enforcingness); however, in some player's view, the strategy corresponding to some 
other player is not a best response for that player to the candidate profile. Clearly, equilibrium, rationality, and 
the players' beliefs are not reconcilable in this case.9 We could try to resolve this problem by throwing away 
all the candidate equilibria that carry an inner contradiction as above. However, on the one hand, this may well 
leave us without an equilibrium. On the other hand, in a one-shot interaction, even if the social norm is to play 
Nash, there is no reason to expect in our setup any correlation among the players' choice of strategies. 
Therefore, we should consider each player as a separate Bayesian decision-maker (c.f. Tan and Werlang, 
1988), who chooses her action according to her own view of the world, whether this view is correct or not. 
Thus, we suggest that each player should be able to derive her "optimal" strategy via eductive reasoning. Those 
who expect more collective rationality of equilibrium play can always impose a refinement, which forces the 
strategies to satisfy the individual constraints simultaneously (c.f. Greenberg, 1996). 
4.1. Independent beliefs 
In this subsection, we assume that the different layers of any belief hierarchy are uncorrelated. Note that we do 
not rule out correlation within the same layer: thus, a (subjective) prior distribution of the vector of attributes, 
                                                        
8 For notational simplicity, we assume that the belief hierarchies are composed of three layers. The generalization to more layers is 
straightforward. 
9 Note that if the game is common knowledge, this problem does not arise in equilibrium, since whenever a player believes that 
another player should not follow the recommendation, that player in fact does not. 8 
or the distribution of the vector of beliefs about the attributes need not be independent. The most important 
consequence of this independence assumption is that the conditional expectations with respect to the different 
layers of beliefs can be evaluated separately. As we will see, under this scenario we can10 maintain Harsányi’s 
definition that types and attributes are equivalent, and thus the players’ strategies continue to be a function of 
only their attributes. 
More formally, let us define Player i's beliefs as follows 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
3 2 1 , , K R K R K R i i i D D D ˛ D D ˛ D ˛
 
That is, Player i's first-order belief is a probability distribution over the attribute space. Her second-order belief 
is a probability distribution over the first-order beliefs of Player j, etc.  
 Next, note that – for the purposes of (conditional) expected utility calculations, with strategies that 
only depend on the attributes – the beliefs described above can be integrated out11 to yield 




i i D ˛ D ˛ D ˛
 
That is, all the beliefs can be interpreted as beliefs over some player’s attribute space. In particular, Player i 
can “use” her second-order belief just as if she knew Player j’s belief about her attribute. Similarly, Player i’s 
third-order belief represents the belief she thinks Player j thinks she has about his attribute. In other words, it is 
as if the higher-order beliefs were all degenerate point beliefs. 
 We are now ready to define the corresponding generalizations of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and 
Bayes Rationalizability. 
Definition 4 Conditional on his beliefs, a strategy of Player i, si(.), forms part of a Subjective Bayesian 
Equilibrium (SBE) profile if and only if there exists a strategy  () .
i
j s , j „ i, such that  
( ) i
i




j R BR , s ˛ s . 
Note that, when Player i’s second-order beliefs are correct, the sets of SBE and BNE strategies (not the 
profiles!) coincide. On the other hand, SBE suffers from the drawback that it does not use all the information 
available: it is independent of 
ji
i R . This results in an internal inconsistency, since in Player i’s mind, Player j 
does not behave according to SBE. 
Definition 5 Conditional on his beliefs, a strategy of Player i, si(.), is Partially Subjective Rationalizable 
(PASUR) if there exist strategies  () .
i
j s ,  () .
ij
i s  and  () .
iji
j s , j „ i, such that  
( ) i
i












i R BR , s ˛ s . 
                                                        
10 Though we need not, see the next subsection. 
11 C.f. the remark following Definition 1. 9 
PASUR does use all the information, however, it is a rather weak concept, even when the beliefs are 
consistent. In order to combine the strengths of SBE and PASUR, we propose the following hybrid concept 
instead:12 
Definition 6 Conditional on his beliefs, a strategy of Player i, si(.), forms part of a Mirage Equilibrium 
profile if and only if there exist strategies  () .
i
j s  and  () .
ij
i s , j „ i, such that 
( ) i
i












i R BR , s ˛ s . 
In a Mirage Equilibrium, the highest levels of the strategic belief hierarchy constitute a SBE, while the lower 
levels are calculated via the backward induction logic of PASUR. This assumption has both a positive and a 
normative reading. The descriptive interpretation is based on the fact that the SBE assumption is equivalent to 
positing that the players substitute their third-order strategic belief about their opponent's strategy, 
iji
j s , with 
their first-order one, 
i
j s . We claim that such a substitution is plausible. Note that what our boundedly rational 
agent is trying to do is to check the "consistency" of her beliefs. She does that by ensuring that at every level, 
her strategic beliefs are a best response to the following level, conditional on her corresponding parametric 
beliefs. When she attempts the verification of her third-order strategic beliefs, she is at a loss since there are no 
parametric beliefs available. In the absence of verifiable third-order strategic beliefs, she could leave her 
second-order strategic beliefs unrestricted as well. However, a more sensible solution is to substitute the 
“missing” beliefs by the "closest" proxy available: the previous level beliefs over the same object. This rule of 
thumb is consistent with the so-called "false consensus" effect found by Ross, Greene and House (1977). 
According to this phenomenon, experimental subjects tend to believe that others share their beliefs to a much 
larger extent than should follow from Bayesian updating.  
A normative justification of the Mirage Equilibrium concept is based on the assumption that Nash 
behavior is to be desired from – even boundedly – rational agents. Consequently, they are supposed to 
conjecture Nash-like strategies whenever it does not contradict their information. In our case, in the lower 
levels of their (subjective) belief hierarchy the Nash conjecture would be inconsistent with their parametric 
beliefs together with their opponents' rationality. At the top of their belief hierarchy, however, this restriction 
disappears and they are free to posit Nash behavior. We offer a further justification in Subsection 4.3. 
 Returning to our Cournot example, it is easy to see that SBE coincides with BNE, since SBE does not 
use the information contained in g(.) and, therefore, even if it is inconsistent it does not show in the solution.  
Bob's PASUR strategies can be deduced from the solutions of the following system: 
b = argmaxq q(1 - q - aa1i - (1 - a)a2i), 
 a1i = argmaxq q(1 - q - bij), (II) 
a2i = argmaxq q(1 - 2(q + bij)), 
                                                        
12 It is immediate that Mirage Equilibrium is a refinement of PASUR. 10 
bij = argmaxq ￿ q(1 - q - ya1iji - (1 - y)a2iji) g(y) dy = argmaxq q(1 - q - ga1iji - (1 - g)a2iji), 
where g is the mean of g(.), and a1iji ˛ [0, 1/2] and a2iji ˛ [0, 1/4] are (strategically) unconstrained. 




4 15 a -
£ £
g - a -
b  . 
Note that, when a is close to 1 and g is close to zero, the SBE strategy is not PASUR! This is because SBE 
does not incorporate the highly inconsistent third-order belief. 
Bob's Mirage strategy can be deduced from the solution of the following system: 
b = argmaxq q(1 - q - aa1i - (1 - a)a2i), 
 a1i = argmaxq q(1 - q - bij), (III) 
a2i = argmaxq q(1 - 2(q + bij)), 
bij = argmaxq q(1 - q - ga1i - (1 - g)a2i). 
Resolving (III) for b, we obtain: 
b = 
32
3 / 4 4 16 g - a -
. 
4.2. Correlated beliefs  
If we allow the different layers of beliefs to be correlated, we no longer can reduce them to distributions over 
the other player’s attribute. So we have to work with 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). , ,
3 2 1 K K K K R K K R K R i i i D · D · D · D ˛ D · D ˛ D ˛
 
Note that, given a higher-order belief, the lower-order ones are redundant, since they are given by the 
appropriate marginals of the higher-order belief.13 
Given this more complex belief hierarchy, we need to reconsider the proper definition of a strategy in 
this context. The standard approach is that the strategy mapping has as its argument all the relevant parameters 
of a player that are not common knowledge, that is, the "types." When common knowledge is lacking, 
however, this rule is inappropriate. Since it is within the eductive reasoning of a player where the others' 
strategies appear, the right definition is that a player's strategy depends on all of the relevant parameters he has 
a belief about and are not common knowledge. In other words, since our theory is Bayesian, and thus it is 
                                                        
13 Consequently, to be precise, we nee to require that the hierarchy be “coherent,” in the sense that it does not contain inner 
contradictions. For more on this aspect, see Brandenburger and Dekel (1993). 11 
based on the Savage axioms, everything whose existence a player knows about he has a belief about and, 
consequently, anything a player does not have a belief about does not exist in that player's world. Then, 
obviously, he should not expect his opponents' strategy to depend on such objects. This definition, results in 
every player believing that the other player conditions his strategy on one layer less of his belief hierarchy than 
herself.  
Based on the above discussion, we define a strategy for Player i as si: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) K K K K Ki D · D · D · D ·  ﬁ Si, and for Player j as 
i
j ó :  ( ) ( ) K K K j D · D ·  ﬁ Sj . To 
follow in the tradition of Nash, we can then require that players should use strategies, which form part of a 
profile that is autoconfirming given their belief hierarchy. To choose among the many ways the model can be 
closed, we impose continuity, in the sense that, when beliefs are correct, our solution should coincide with that 
of a model with common knowledge. Let us denote an arbitrary belief of Player i by 
m
i r , m £ 3. 
Definition 7 The strategy of Player i,  ) , (
3
i i i r k s , forms part of an Third-Order Subjective Bayesian 
Equilibrium (TOSUBE) profile if and only if there exists a strategy profile,  ( )
2 , j j
i
j r k s , such that 




j i i i r r k BR r k s ˛ s , and 
  ii)  ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ) , marg , ( ) , (
2 3 1 2
j i K K K i i i j j
i
j r r r k BR r k D · D · D · s ˛ s  for  j „ i. 
The generalization of Rationalizability is more straightforward: 
Definition 8  The strategy of Player i,  ) , (
3
i i i r k s , is Third-Order Subjective Rationalizable (TOSUR) if and 
only if there exist strategy profiles  ( )
2 , j j
i
j r k s ,  ( )
1 , i i
ij
i r k s  and  ( ) j
iji
j k s , such that 




j i i i r r k BR r k s ˛ s , 






j r r k BR r k s ˛ s  and 






i r k BR r k s ˛ s . 
Let us return to our example. Bob's TOSUBE strategy can be deduced from the solution of the 
following system:14 
b(1,y,1,1g) = argmaxq q(1 - q - y a(1,1,g) - (1 - y)a(2,1,g)), 
 a(1,1,g) = argmaxq ￿ q(1 - q - b(1,y,1,1g)) g(y) dy, (IV) 
 a(2,1,g) = argmaxq ￿ q(1 - 2(q + b(1,y,1,1g))) g(y) dy. 
Resolving (II) for  b(1,a,1,1g), we obtain: 
                                                        
14 The arguments of Bob's (b) and Ann's (a) strategies are the attribute and the layers of beliefs, while y is a dummy variable. 12 
b(1,a,1,1g) = 
24
3 12 g - a -
, 
which clearly coincides with his Mirage strategy, if only because the payoffs depend linearly on a. As we show 
in the next section, there exists a general equivalence result, when the belief space is further restricted. 
4.3. Degenerate higher-order beliefs: a consistency result 
It is interesting to compare the solution concepts that we defined for independent and correlated beliefs. 
Needless to say, the latter ones can be directly applied even if beliefs are independent. The more relevant 
difference is what are the arguments of the strategies. Consequently, in order to reach a common ground 
between the two types of solution, in this subsection, we restrict attention to the case when higher-order beliefs 
put all the mass on a single point in their support: they are point beliefs. 
Proposition 1 When higher-order beliefs are point beliefs, conditional on her beliefs, Player i’s set of 
TOSUBE strategies coincides with her set of Mirage Equilibrium strategies, while her set of TOSUR 
strategies coincides with her set of PASUR strategies.  
Proof:  We only prove the first statement, the proof of the second one is analogous. Let us write down the 
system of equations,15 generated by the iterated use of the two rules in Definition 7, which needs to be solved 
to calculate Player i's FOSBE strategy, given her beliefs, 
3 2 1 3 , , , i i i i i P P P k R = :  
( ) ) , , ( , , ) ( max arg ) , , , (
3 2 1 3 2 1
i i j i i
K x
i i i i i i P P x k V x P P P P k
j
s s ￿ ˛ s ￿
˛ s
 
( ) ) , , , ( , , ) ( max arg ) , , (
3 2 3 2 3 2
i i i i j
K y
i i i j P P P y x V y P P P x
i
s s ￿ ˛ s ￿
˛ s
  
( ). ) , , ( , , ) ( max arg ) , , , (
3 2 3 3 2 3
i i j i
K r
i i i i i P P r y V r P P P P y
j
s s ￿ ˛ s ￿
˛ s
 
Here we have used that fact that the beliefs ( )
3 2, i i P P  are point beliefs, twice. Once when we substituted them 
in directly when taking expectations, and once when we interpreted them as beliefs over the parameter space.  
Next, note that we can rewrite the above "equations" taking into account that the P's are given, and therefore 
rather than variables they are parameters. Consequently, we can take them out of the arguments of the 
strategies and replace them, for example, by sequences of player indices: 
( ) ) ( , , ) ( max arg ) (
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15 In fact, they are not equations but best response relations, unless the latter are single-valued. For our argument this distinction is 
immaterial. 13 
But this is just the definition of Mirage Equilibrium. Q.E.D.
 
5. Final remarks 
In this paper, we have sketched the "gains and pains" associated with leaving the standard paradigm of 
common knowledge priors. Rather than setting standards for this uncharted territory, our aim was to generate 
discussion, and to encourage other researchers to investigate the issues involved. We have given a first 
approximation, the rest should be filled in by people more able than us.  
 An obvious extension would be to go beyond the scenario of static, normal form games. Our analysis 
could be seen as part of a dynamic scenario, where the players in each period – or at each information set – 
update their subjective beliefs and play, for example, a Mirage Equilibrium strategy according to their 
posteriors. The real obstacle in extending our analysis to consider dynamic phenomena derives from the 
difficulty in characterizing the appropriate process for updating beliefs.  
 Battigalli and Guaitoli (1988), Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Kalai and Lehrer (1993b) and 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) introduce different versions of Conjectural Equilibrium. This is a concept 
based on von Hayek's observation that a certain pattern of play may be stable (that is, a steady state of a 
learning process) just because the players lack the necessary information to realize that they are playing sub-
optimally. Thus, in a Conjectural Equilibrium, subjective beliefs16 are restricted endogenously: only those 
beliefs are allowed which are not contradicted by the resulting play. Obviously, in the class of one shot 
simultaneous move games, which are the object of this study, these endogenous constraints are not binding.17 
However, in most applications it is likely that the players eventually get confronted with some evidence that is 
inconsistent with their subjective beliefs. Of course, one should expect them to change (update) their beliefs 
upon such an event.  Since we were already taking into account all the consistent strategic belief systems to 
derive the set of Mirage equilibria, it follows that the exogenous beliefs will (also) have to be changed. But at 
which level? Should the first-order beliefs be modified? Or the last-order ones? Alternatively, should the 
magnitude of change be allocated among different levels of beliefs according to a more complex rule? Without 
a specific model at hand, we are unable to answer these questions. In fact, even in specific examples one is 
most likely forced to adopt some ad hoc rule.  
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